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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) takes the lead or a 
significant supporting security role in many of the nation’s most celebrated 
events across the country. Major events that receive the official designation of a 
national special security event and those rated Level 1 on the DHS special event 
rating scale share the same subcommittee planning structure. This thesis focuses on 
the potential vulnerabilities and gaps in the planning process due to groupthink and 
other organizational and individual decision-making pitfalls. This thesis then reviews 
what, if any, potential improvements can be made to the process with the formal 
adoption of a red team component. 
This thesis examines the potential benefits of incorporating red team techniques, 
such as simulation exercises, vulnerability probes, and analytical analysis into 
major-event security planning. Research indicates that their effectiveness varied on the 
organizational leadership, team composition, and independence afforded these teams in 
the performance of their assignment. The process of red teaming is vulnerable to being 
marginalized without proper organizational support. Armed with this knowledge, this 
thesis proposes two recommendations for the formal adoption of red team techniques into 
the subcommittee process of major-event security planning. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) takes the lead or a 
significant supporting security role in many of the nation’s largest and most celebrated 
events across the country. These political, sporting, and cultural events present the 
nation’s adversaries with inviting targets due to the size, scope, and historical 
significance of the occasions. Often these events are attended by senior governmental 
leaders from the United States, as well as foreign countries. Group decision-making 
errors, assumptions in the planning process, and the failure to anticipate an ever-
changing enemy or conditions can leave major events vulnerable to attack or serious 
disruption. Security planners must consider not only purposeful physical attacks, but 
also the whole spectrum of environmental, fire and life safety, and civil disobedience 
when designing countermeasures to risk.  
This thesis analyzes the planning process used to design and implement security 
procedures for major events throughout the country. Specifically, it examines security 
planning for events designated as a national special security event or those that receive a 
special event activity rating Level 1 from the DHS. This thesis focuses on the potential 
vulnerabilities and gaps in the planning process due to groupthink and other 
organizational decision-making pitfalls. The subcommittee process employed in these 
major events has proven effective in marshaling tremendous amounts of resources and 
ensuring that areas of responsibility are well-defined; however, it leaves open the 
potential for individual and organizational biases to impact planning. This project has 
explored the varieties of red team techniques available to major event security planners 
and asked the question: How would the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) benefit 
from formally adopting a red team component to major-event security planning? This 
thesis then reviews which, if any, potential improvements can be made to the process 
with the formal adoption of a red team component. This paper derives data and evidence 
exclusively from publically available academic literature and after-action reports. It 
features a case study of the 2009 presidential inauguration, drawn from comparable 
publically  released  material.   This  project  uses a blend of policy analysis and the 
xiv 
case  study  method  during  the course of  this project.  The  case  study method  relies 
heavily  on  the results of  a small group of  events that may be vulnerable to sampling 
bias and lead to results that may not be easily generalizable.
The concepts and techniques of red teaming are being taught and increasingly 
used and accepted throughout the United States within the Department of Defense and 
the intelligence and law enforcement communities. The potential benefits and drawbacks 
of simulations, vulnerability probes, and analytical techniques have been explored in this 
project. While not all red team techniques are ideally suited for use in major event 
security design, the expanded use of analytical analysis has the potential to challenge 
organizational thought and assumptions. These techniques, however, need to be 
completed within the subcommittee framework used in the design and execution of 
security for major events.  
Based on the findings on red team performance and execution pitfalls, this thesis 
has made two proposals to insert formally an analytical red team capability into the 
framework used in major-event security planning. The proposals have the potential to 
place properly trained individuals into the framework at the appropriate time to make 
improvements into the planning process. These proposals, however, must navigate the 
minefield of potential execution errors outlined in this thesis. While the DHS may 
theoretically benefit from the formal adoption of analytical red team techniques, the 
execution limitations discussed in this thesis reduce the likelihood for ideal results. The 
DHS needs to consider these limitations before formally adopting a red team component 
into the framework for major-event security planning.  
xv 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
We can be blind to the obvious, and we are also blind to our blindness.1 
~ Daniel Kahneman 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) takes the lead or a 
significant supporting security role in many of the nation’s largest and most celebrated 
events across the country. Examples of such events include presidential inauguration 
ceremonies, major political conventions, State of the Union events, world leader 
summits, such as the annual United Nations General Assembly, and the National 
Football League (NFL) Super Bowl. These political, sporting, and cultural events 
present the nation’s adversaries with inviting targets due to the size, scope, and 
historical significance of the occasions. Each year, these events draw hundreds of 
thousands of attendees and they are watched on television and social media by millions 
of viewers across the country and around the world. Often, these events are attended by 
senior governmental leaders from the United States, as well as foreign countries. An 
example can be seen in the 2012 NATO Summit held in Chicago, Illinois where 
senior diplomats and heads of state from all 28 member nations were in attendance.  
Securing the nation’s most significant events requires the participation of the 
entire homeland security enterprise. Local, state, and federal agencies come together to 
design and execute security plans under significant resource and often planning timeline 
constraints.2 Currently, a subcommittee process of coordination is employed for these 
events and this approach has positive and negative attributes. Small groups of homeland 
security leaders determine the threats and vulnerabilities that will receive the most 
resources and countermeasures in the design and implementation of security plans.  
1 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011), 24. 
2 Planning timelines vary by the type of event and can range from years (2002 Olympic Games in Salt 
Lake City, Utah) to days (U.S. Presidential funerals, such as the 2006 funeral of Former President Gerald 
Ford).  
2 
Group decision-making errors, assumptions in the planning process, and the 
failure to anticipate an ever-changing enemy or conditions can leave major events 
vulnerable to attack or serious disruption. Security planners must consider not only 
purposeful physical attacks, but also the whole spectrum of environmental, fire, and life 
safety, and civil disobedience when designing countermeasures to risk. At worst, a real or 
perceived significant security failure in these events could lead to the destabilization of 
the U.S. government, as well as negatively impacting world geo-politics. Financial 
markets around the world can also be jeopardized in the short-term with trillions of 
dollars of wealth at risk in the aftermath of a major security incident. As an example, the 
New York Stock Exchange lost more than seven percent in value in the first day of stock 
trading after the terror attacks of 9/11.3 At the very least, poor operational planning by 
security managers will quietly lead to the waste of millions of dollars of tax payer funds 
in designing and executing plans ill-suited for the risks of today and in no way preparing 
for the enemy of tomorrow. In an effort to avoid these worst-case scenarios this thesis 
asks: How would the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) benefit from formally 
adopting an analytical red team component into the subcommittee process for major-
event security planning? 
This thesis analyzes the planning process used to design and implement security 
procedures for major events throughout the country. Specifically, it examines security 
planning for events designated as a national special security event (NSSE) or those that 
receive a special event activity rating (SEAR) Level 1 from the DHS. Special events that 
fall below these ratings often do not require the same level of multi-agency coordination 
and do not use the same organizational framework as NSSE and SEAR Level 1 events.4 
NSSE and SEAR Level 1 events use a subcommittee design that makes the decision-
making process unique. Events that receive a lower SEAR typically do not use the 
subcommittee process and are not subject to the same planning process issues. The 
3 Mark Davis, “How 9/11 Affected the U.S. Stock Market,” Investopedia, September 9, 2011, http:// 
www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0911/how-september-11-affected-the-u.s.-stock-market.aspx. Stock 
market losses did rebound within one month; however, the short-term risk to the financial markets was 
demonstrated.  
4 This rating does not mean that these events are at any less risk from attack or disruption, just that the 
planning process is different and outside the scope of this paper.  
3 
processes by which events are rated by the DHS, as well as the subcommittee planning 
process, are discussed in Chapter III.  
This thesis focuses on the potential vulnerabilities and gaps in the planning 
process due to groupthink and other organizational decision-making pitfalls. It then 
reviews which, if any, potential improvements can be made to the process with the formal 
adoption of a red team component. Would the formal adoption of red teaming into the 
planning process reduce individual biases and reduce organizational blindness? Would 
potential incidents of groupthink be reduced by the aggressive use of a red team 
component or the adoption of formal techniques, such as the “devil’s advocate”? If the 
answer is yes, determining exactly “who” should complete this analysis is just as 
important as “if” it should be done at all. Additionally, this thesis reviews currently used 
red teams to determine potential pitfalls and limitations in the execution of these 
techniques. The results of this analysis indicate that the subcommittee process used in 
major event security is vulnerable to group decision-making errors; typically, security 
experts recommend red teams. In this particular context, however, formally adopting 
analytical red teams may not offer a failsafe solution.  
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature on groupthink and other common decision-making pitfalls is widely 
available. Documentation on the role of groupthink specifically in the security planning 
for major events, however, is virtually non-existent. Potential reasons for this lack of 
academic literature may include the perceived necessity of governmental organizations to 
maintain operational security in the planning process, as well as the lack of a significant 
catastrophic occurrence involving a major security event.  
1. Groupthink and Other Decision-Making Traps
Although the basic concept of groupthink was outlined in the 1952 Fortune 
Magazine article entitled “Groupthink” authored by William H. Whyte Jr., it was not 
until 1972 that the groundbreaking research of Yale University psychologist Irving L. 
Janis propelled the theory into the mainstream of psychology. The publication of Janis’s 
 4 
original work, Victims of Groupthink, in 1972 was followed up a decade later by his 
expanded version, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos.  
Janis defined groupthink as “a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, 
and moral judgment that results from in-group pressures.”5 Janis began his work by 
outlining the “imperfect” connection between groupthink and decision-making disasters. 
No direct correlation exists between poor outcomes and defective decision making.6 Pure 
luck, adversarial incompetence, and “lucky accidents” often lead to good outcomes in 
decisions, but these flashes should not be confused with actual high functioning teams. 
This concept is especially important when considering the security preparations for major 
events, as a lack of an incident should not be construed as evidence of outstanding or 
effective planning.  
Through his academic work on group decision making, Janis identified several 
conditions often present in groupthink, symptoms of the phenomenon, and the 
consequences of defective decision making. Janis also outlined the significant symptoms 
and organizational structures frequently present in occurrences of groupthink. He 
reviewed case studies of some of modern histories largest “fiascos” to include Pearl 
Harbor, the Bay of Pigs invasion, and the escalation of the Korean and Vietnam wars. 
From these case studies, Janis identified the following eight symptoms most often 
associated with groupthink: illusion of invulnerability, the belief in the group’s inherent 
morality, collective rationalization that inhibits consideration of new ideas, stereotyped 
views of the enemy, self-censorship, shared sense of unanimity, direct pressure against 
those members who do not share the group consensus, and lastly, the emergence of self-
appointed “mindguards.”7 Mindguards are described by Janis as “group members who 
protect the group from adverse information that might shatter their shared complacency 
                                                 
5 Irving Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos (Boston: Houston 
Mifflin Company, 1982), 9. This book is a revised and enlarged version of his original 1972 work entitled 
Victims of Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascos.  
6 Ibid., 11. 
7 Ibid., 174–175.  
 5 
about the effectiveness and morality of their decisions.”8 These symptoms do not exist in 
every situation and often they exist in varying degrees.  
Conditions often present in cases of groupthink, referred to by Janis as 
“antecedent,” can be structural or psychological in nature. Structural conditions to 
groupthink include a high-level of insulation of the group, the lack of impartial 
leadership, lack of decision-making norms, and homogeneity of group membership.9 
Psychological conditions for groupthink include high stress from external threats with 
little hope of a better solution, low self-esteem temporarily induced by recent failures, 
and difficulties in determining feasible alternatives in decisions involving moral 
dilemmas.10  
The organizational structure within which a group operates also has an impact on 
the occurrence of groupthink and decision-making performance. Janis identified four 
organizational structural antecedent conditions present in many cases of groupthink: 
insulation of the group, lack of impartial leadership, lack of a normative decision process, 
and group homogeneity.11  
These four structural antecedent conditions discussed by Janis were elaborated on 
in James Ricciuti’s 2014 master’s thesis: “Groupthink: A Significant Threat to the 
Homeland Security of the United States.” Ricciuti’s work identified evidence of 
groupthink in several DHS component agencies to include the United Stated Secret 
Service and the Federal Air Marshal’s Service.12  
Janis’s case study research focused on observable consequences of groupthink in 
political situations. The more symptoms of groupthink exhibited, the more likely that 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 175.  
9 Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos, 244.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 James E. Ricciuti, “Groupthink: A Significant Threat to the Homeland Security of the United 
States” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 46–51.  
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defective decision making will occur in the group setting.13 Janis focused on the 
following seven observable consequences of defective decision making: 
• incomplete survey of alternatives 
• incomplete survey of objectives 
• failure to examine risks of preferred choice 
• failure to reappraise initially rejected alternatives 
• poor information search 
• selective bias in processing information at hand 
• failure to work out contingency plans14  
Individual decision-making errors are actually made worse in groups in many 
cases according to Cass Sunstein and Reid Hastie’s book, Wiser: Getting Beyond 
Groupthink to Make Groups Smarter. Many individual decision-making issues, such as 
the availability and representative heuristics, egocentric bias, and the sunk cost fallacy, 
are all amplified in the group setting.15 Additionally, Sunstein and Hastie proposed that 
the concept of group polarization increases in groups for three principle reasons: 
informational influence, social pressures, and group confidence. Informational influences 
refer to the concept that individuals have a natural tendency to follow arguments that 
mirror their own.16 Group confidence is used by Sunstein and Hastie to mean that 
individuals who agree with one another have a tendency to push the group to the more 
extreme position.17 Like-minded individuals can “convince” themselves of the validity of 
their collective thoughts by simply reinforcing it within the group. The chances of group 
polarization can also be increased when the members of the group have a shared 
identity.18 In-group and out-group identities can work to strengthen feelings of group 
                                                 
13 Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos, 175.  
14 Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos, 175, 244. 
15 Cass Sunstein and Reid Hastie, Wiser: Getting Beyond Groupthink to Make Groups Smarter (Boston: 
Harvard Business Review Press, 2015), 44–51.  
16 Ibid., 83.  
17 Ibid., 84–85.  
18 Ibid., 85.  
 7 
polarization in decision making. The law enforcement profession can drive strong 
feelings of social identity that can feed into potential group polarization.19  
Not only can groups impact decision-making capabilities, but the actual 
organizational framework can have a negative impact on decision making and planning. 
Gillian Tett, a cultural anthropologist, focused on the sub-divisions that exist within large 
organizations and the lack of communication between these sub-groups in her 2015 book, 
The Silo Effect. This book focused on eight different case studies involving both 
government agencies and private industries to examine how groups interact with one 
another and the gaps that can develop between “silos of experts” within the same 
organization. Tett proposed that specialized groups of subject matter experts are a 
positive development in the modern world, but can lead to planning errors and poor 
information exchange.20 “Fragmentation can create information bottlenecks and stifle 
innovation. Above all else, silos can create tunnel vision or mental blindness, which 
causes people to do stupid things,” according to Tett.21 These “silos” resemble the 
subcommittee framework used in the design and execution of major event security 
discussed in Chapter III.  
Gary Klein’s book, Seeing What Others Don’t, outlines several ways in which 
organizational bureaucracy can impede insights and inspired solutions. The 
“predictability trap” occurs when team members bring creative ideas to management; 
however, the agency resists these ideas because they inherently will change the 
preexisting operational plan. This resistance comes from a desire to maintain as much 
predictability as possible, as insights and creative ideas bring instability and potentially 
unknown outcomes. Some organizations intrinsically place a premium on the reduction of 
errors and uncertainty that can get in the way of creative decision making.22 This focus 
on the reduction of errors can lead to agencies attempting simply to dust off the old 
                                                 
19 M. Brent Hood, “Us versus Them: Effects of Group Dynamics on Leadership,” FBI Law 
Enforcement Bulletin, June 2015, https://leb.fbi.gov/2015/june/us-versus-them-effects-of-group-dynamics-
on-leadership.  
20 Tet Gillian, The Silo Effect (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2015), 13–14.  
21 Ibid., 14.  
22 Gary Klein, Seeing What Others Don’t (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2013), 157.  
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playbook from the last event and update it to fit the current scenario. This concept was 
described as “methodism” by Carl von Clausewitz, as discussed by Dietrich Dorner in his 
book, The Logic of Failure. Dorner went on to explain that “psychological experiments 
have demonstrated how people’s range of actions is limited by their tendency to act in 
accordance with pre-established patterns.”23 
Even potentially more insidious is the subtle individual bias that may exist against 
creativity. The Psychological Science article, “The Bias Against Creativity: Why People 
Desire But Reject Creative Ideas?,” written by Jennifer Mueller and associates, detailed 
two studies to measure participant’s implicit, as well as explicit attitudes toward creativity 
relative to practicality in controlled experiments. Study results indicated that when 
participants were given an immediate goal of reducing uncertainty, it led to lower ratings 
of the perceived creativity of words, which occurred despite the participants 
demonstrating a positive explicit association towards creativity. The second experiment 
demonstrated that introducing an element of uncertainty into the process promoted a 
“negative association with creativity relative to practicality and extended this finding by 
showing that bias against creativity interfered with participants’ ability to recognize a 
creative idea.”24 As much as individuals expressed a desire to embrace creative solutions, 
participants in this test consistently chose practicality and predictability.  
The desire for predictability was so strong in corporate America that it led to the 
design and implementation of the Six Sigma program in the late 1980s. This program was 
designed by Motorola as a way to reduce errors and improve the quality of their 
products.25 Six Sigma was initially extremely successful in reducing production errors 
and costs, but at the expense of innovation in the long term.26  
Klein also focused on what he referred to as the “perfection trap” in Seeing What 
Others Don’t. Perfection in this context means an organizational desire to execute the 
                                                 
23 Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure (New York: Metropolitan Book, 1996), 45.  
24 Jennifer S. Mueller, Shimul Melwani, and Jack A. Goncalo, “The Bias Against Creativity: Why 
People Desire but Reject Creative Ideas,” Psychological Science 23, no. 1 (2012): 16.  
25 Klein, Seeing What Others Don’t, 222.  
26 Ibid., 223.  
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plan exactly as was initially designed.27 Klein highlighted that for managers, a lot of 
upside for executing the same plan successfully is involved, as opposed to trying new and 
creative approaches. The risk involved in attempting new and innovative approaches 
outweighs the potential creative upside. This “perfection trap” pushes leaders to use old, 
and potentially no longer appropriate, strategies and methods.  
In addition to the conscious decision to resist changes in the design of operational 
security plans, the theory of cognitive dissonance can impact the process in a negative 
way. Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson describe cognitive dissonance as “the engine that 
drives self-justification, the energy that produces the need to justify our actions and 
decisions-especially the wrong ones” in their 2015 book entitled Mistakes Were Made 
(But Not by Me).28 This dissonance leads individuals to focus on information that 
supports their original hypothesis while excluding new information that threatens their 
position. Tavris and Aronson noted the “backfire effect,” in which individuals faced with 
new information actually increases the support for their original incorrect opinion.29 Why 
change the plans for the 2017 State of the Union Address when the plans from 2016 went 
smoothly?  
2. Counterpoints to Groupthink 
Several academic studies have attempted to quantify the impact of groupthink and 
the symptoms outlined by Irving Janis over the last few decades. 
Ramon Aldag and Sally Riggs Fuller’s article in The Psychological Bulletin, 
“Beyond Fiascos: A Reappraisal of the Groupthink Phenomenon and a New Model of 
Group Decision Processes” takes a hard look at groupthink. They postulated that 
groupthink has become popular due more to the “intuitive appeal” than actual empirical 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 156.  
28 Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson, Mistakes Were Made (but Not by Me) (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin, 2015), 15.  
29 Ibid., 26. This “backfire effect” is similar to several of the symptoms of groupthink described by 
Irving Janis.  
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evidence.30 The original Janis case studies provided a small sample of qualitative work 
involving large-scale decisions that calls into question the overall applicability to group 
decision making. Aldag and Fuller proposed that the groupthink theory needs to be 
updated incorporating the last few decades worth of research on decision making.31 
While the overall concept of groupthink is called into question with this work, still other 
studies looked at particular pieces of the groupthink phenomenon.  
The impact of leadership style (directional versus participative) and devil’s 
advocacy, a red team technique discussed further in Chapter III, in group decision 
making were studied in the The Psychological Record, “Groupthink: Deciding with the 
Leader and the Devil” by Zenglo Chen and associates in 1996. This study controlled both 
the leadership style and devil’s advocacy role in contrast to other empirically based 
academic studies.32 Chen et al. ran a study with undergraduate volunteers participating in 
the “Lost at Sea”33 survival task with confederates acting as both group leaders and 
devil’s advocates. The empirical results indicated that lower quality decisions were made 
when the confederate leader demonstrated a directive leadership style (as opposed to 
participative); however, the devil’s advocate produced no appreciable improvements to 
the results.34 The authors proposed that the devil’s advocate role playing was not strong 
enough to influence the group decision making. This concept is critical when considering 
the potential utilization of the devil’s advocate in major security planning subcommittees.  
                                                 
30 Ramon Aldag and Sally Riggs Fuller, “Beyond Fiascos: A Reappraisal of the Groupthink 
Phenomenon and a New Model of Group Decision Processes,” The Psychological Bulletin 113, no. 3 
(1993): 547.  
31 Aldag and Fuller, “Beyond Fiascos,” 549.  
32 Zenglo Chen et al., “Groupthink: Deciding with the Leader and Devil,” The Psychological Record 
46, no. 4 (Fall 1996), http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Groupthink%3a+deciding+with+the+leader+and+the+ 
devil.-a018911798.  
33 The Lost at Sea scenario is a team building exercise in which group members must work together to 
rank order items to be salvaged in a hypothetical boating accident.  
34 Chen et al., “Groupthink.”  
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B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This paper derives data and evidence exclusively from publically available 
academic literature and after-action reports. It features a case study of the 2009 
presidential inauguration, drawn from comparable publically released material.  
This thesis uses a blend of policy analysis and the case study method during the 
course of this project. This method has potential negative aspects that should be 
considered. This thesis uses official after-action reports that may, or may not, be a 
complete assessment of the event. Agencies could potentially have their self-interest in 
mind leading to a less than complete appraisal of major event security performance. 
Lastly, the case study method relies heavily on the results of a small group of events that 
may be vulnerable to sampling bias and lead to results that may not be easily 
generalizable. 
This project is broken into six chapters. Chapter II introduces the concept of red 
teaming and provides the historical origins for these techniques. This chapter also 
outlines successful uses of red teaming across the government, as well as introduces three 
different varieties of techniques: simulation exercises, vulnerability probes, and analytical 
analysis.  
Chapter III analyzes the legal framework of responsibilities for local, state, and 
federal agencies, as well as the official process by which NSSEs and SEAR 1 events are 
classified, funded, and protected. These responsibilities are derived from presidential 
order and department regulation. This chapter also reviews the formal organizational 
structure from several recent major events, such as the 2016 Super Bowl in Santa Clara, 
CA, the 2012 Democratic National Convention in Charlotte, NC, and the 2012 
Republican National Convention in Tampa, FL. Chapter III also introduces the executive 
subcommittee model used in major event security design and identifies vulnerabilities to 
the process from both an institutional and individual perspective. This thesis examines 
the antecedent conditions of groupthink and analyzes the executive subcommittee model 
used in the security design for NSSEs and SEAR 1 events for potential vulnerability.  
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Chapter IV, a case study review of the 2009 presidential inauguration, outlines the 
planning errors that led to crowd management issues. This case study draws material 
from the declassified after-action report prepared for Congress. This unique document 
provides a rare look into the subcommittee process for major events including the 
assumptions made by key members on the planning team.  
Chapter V attempts to insert red team techniques into the subcommittee process 
and proposes how red teaming might have reduced these crowd issues in this major 
event. This chapter also outlines the critical execution errors and pitfalls that potentially 
reduce the effectiveness of these techniques in improving decision making. These 
execution errors are drawn from a review of current red team literature primarily based 
on Department of Defense (DOD) experiences.  
This project proposes a set of policy recommendations for future adoption by the 
DHS and such component agencies as the United States Secret Service (USSS). Several 
critical implementation issues are discussed and addressed in this paper as well. Policy 
recommendations for the inclusion of red teaming in major event security design must 
consider several of the following critical questions: who exactly completes the red 
teaming, how will they integrate into the current subcommittee framework, and what 
results can reasonably be expected from this addition.  
C. ANSWERS AND QUESTIONS  
This project began with an interest in examining the process by which groups of 
local, state, and federal homeland security professionals make decisions on how best to 
secure major events. The impact of groupthink, heuristics, and individual biases play a 
role in group decision making and homeland security professionals are not immune to 
their effects. This thesis assumed that the introduction of red team techniques into the 
subcommittee model of major-event security planning would be a natural improvement to 
the overall group decision-making process. The research in this project quickly identified 
that it was not always the case. Theoretically, the techniques outlined in Chapter II may 
reduce groupthink, improve problem-solving skills, and reduce organizational blindness. 
In reality, the execution of these techniques present challenges that the researcher did not 
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anticipate at the beginning of this project. The recommendations contained in this project 
attempt to account for the difficulties identified in the research for this thesis.  
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II. RED TEAM TECHNIQUES  
The greatest of faults, I should say, is to be conscious of none.35 
~ Thomas Carlyle  
 
This chapter introduces the concept of red teaming and the most common 
varieties of techniques and how they may improve group decision-making and 
performance. The DOD and the American intelligence community (IC) have recognized 
potential pitfalls in their planning and analytical operations and embraced the concept of 
red teaming across their organizations. This same concept may improve the security 
planning operations for major security events by reducing groupthink and challenging 
organizational assumptions. 
A. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF RED TEAM TECHNIQUES  
Pope Gregory IX, in an attempt to formalize and exert greater control over the 
canonization process in the Roman Catholic Church, established the Advocatus Diaboli in 
1234.36 The Advocatus Diaboli, or Devil’s Advocate, was tasked as the “designated 
dissenter” and was responsible for providing objections and counter-evidence against all 
individuals nominated for sainthood.37 This new process inadvertently gave birth to the 
concept of red teaming, demonstrating the potential role for contrarian thought in 
organizations. Pope John Paul II discarded the devil’s advocate when he streamlined the 
canonization process in 1983.38 Perhaps incidentally, Pope John Paul II also presided 
over more beatifications and canonizations in the next 20 years than had occurred over 
the preceding 2,000 years.39 It is difficult to determine the effectiveness of the Advocatus 
Diaboli in the canonization process for the Roman Catholic Church, but the removal of 
                                                 
35 Tarvis and Aronson, Mistakes Were Made, 58.  






the designated dissenter lead to a sharp increase in those granted this rare declaration 
from the church.  
Although red team techniques have been used historically in the American 
military under various names, the very term “red team” originated from the DOD during 
the Cold War in the 1960s.40 The DOD’s use of red teams and techniques was sporadic 
and inconsistent across the armed services until the 2003 Defense Science Board task 
force report titled The Role and Status of DOD Red Teaming Activities.41 This report was 
completed in the aftermath of the events of 9/11 and sought to review current red team 
best practices to determine if these techniques should be put to greater use in the 
department.42 This task force made the formal recommendation that the Secretary of 
Defense “take steps to inculcate effective red team use throughout the department” to 
identify weaknesses before real adversaries do.  
The largest single source of red team training in the United States is the U.S. 
Army’s University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS) located in Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas. The UFMCS was formed in 2004 and tasked with changing the 
way the military thinks, including countering the effects of groupthink in the formal 
command structure.43 Although technically an Army facility, this course is attended by 
members of all branches of the military. The U.S. Army awards the red team certification 
to individuals who successfully pass the UFMCS course. Army commanders may then 
call on these officers as needed to provide an alternative perspective or to challenge the 
assumptions in planning.44 This technique provides Army leadership with a maximum 
                                                 
40 Zenko, Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy, 26. The “red” referred to the 
United States’ largest adversary at the time: the Soviet Union.  
41 Ibid., 28.  
42 Defense Science Board, The Role and Status of DoD Red Teaming Activities (Washington, DC: 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 2003), 1.  
43 Zenko, Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy, 38. The United States Marine 
Corps also began red team instruction in this same timeframe as part of the Marine Corps University in 
Quantico, Virginia.  
44 Ibid., 39.  
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amount of flexibility without having the expense of having to support a standalone full-
time red team.45  
This program has produced a publically available 240-page manual titled the 
Applied Critical Thinking Handbook, which is, in essence, a formal training manual in 
the discipline of red team techniques used throughout the military.46 In addition to the 
Applied Thinking Handbook, the UFMCS has published the UFMCS Group Think 
Mitigation Guide in 2014. This guide outlines several current strategies to minimize the 
impact of groupthink on operations and used to teach new military officers techniques to 
recognize biases in their thought process.47 Specifically, the handbook advances four 
major tenets designed to improve an individual’s ability to make decisions in constantly 
changing environments: fostering cultural empathy, self-reflection and awareness, 
groupthink mitigation, and applied critical thinking.48  
Although the demand for the courses taught at the UFMCS have been growing 
since inception, no formal measurement of how effective the skills taught there have been 
in improving overall DOD planning and reducing decision-making errors has been 
done.49  
B. THE CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES OF RED TEAMING  
Depending on the sector, business, government, the IC, or the military, red 
teaming may occur under a variety of names and with different goals. Mark Mateski, 
founder and editor of The Red Team Journal, states the goal of the modern red team is “to 
enhance decision making by challenging assumptions and exploring new ideas, typically 
                                                 
45 Zenko, Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy, 39.  
46 Ibid.  
47 Both of these guides are available online to the general public.  
48 University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, The Applied Critical Thinking Handbook 
(formerly the Red Team Handbook), ver. 8.1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: University of Foreign Military and 
Cultural Studies, 2016), 4–7.  
49 Zenko, Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy, 40.  
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from the perspective of an adversary or a competitor.”50 The UFMCS uses the following 
definition: 
Red teaming is a function that provides commanders an independent 
capability to fully explore alternatives in plans, operations, concepts, 
organizations and capabilities in the context of the operational 
environment (OE) and from the perspectives of partners, adversaries and 
others.51 
According to the UFMCS, DOD red team practitioners complete three general 
types of tasks:  
• decision support to operations, planning, and decision making 
• critically review and analyze existing plans 
• emulate enemy behavior and testing52 
Red teaming is not an exact science and the appropriate technique used will depend on 
the individual scenario in question. While attempting to complete the previously listed 
tasks, red teams will “challenge facts and explicit assumptions, look for implicit 
(unstated) assumptions, identifying cultural assumptions and developing targeted cultural 
questions for subject matter experts, challenging the problem frame (and proposing 
alternative frames), identifying cognitive biases and symptoms of underlying 
groupthink.”53 To this end, Micah Zenko identified three main varieties of red team 
techniques: simulations, vulnerability probes, and alternative analysis.54 An organization 
may choose to employ one, two, or all three of these techniques depending on the 
circumstances.  
                                                 
50 Mark Mateski, “Red Teaming: A Balanced View,” The Red Team Journal, February 14, 2013, 
http://redteamjournal.com/2013/02/red-teaming-a-balanced-view/.  
51 University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, The Applied Critical Thinking Handbook 
(formerly the Red Team Handbook), 1. The term “commander” is military terminology; however, it is 
synonymous with supervisor or team leader in the civilian world. This military definition closely matches 
the goals of security subcommittees in the security planning for major events.  
52 Ibid., 2.  
53 Ibid., 3.  
54 Zenko, Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy, XXI–XXII.  
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1. Red Team Techniques—Simulation Exercises  
Simulations are often conducted in advance of significant events in an attempt to 
identify planning gaps and to anticipate how an adversary might behave. These 
simulations can vary in terms of complexity and realism depending on the circumstances 
of the event. Simulations may take the form of passive tabletop exercises or active 
operations complete with roleplaying actors. An example of major event simulations can 
be seen in the 2015 airspace exercise conducted by the North American Aerospace 
Defense Command (NORAD) in support of Super Bowl XLIX, a SEAR 1 event, held in 
Glendale, Arizona. Exercise Falcon Virgo was an airspace defense exercise designed to 
test the capabilities of the U.S. Air Force, Federal Aviation Authority (FAA), and the 
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) to identify and intercept unauthorized aircraft from the 
temporary restricted airspace surrounding the stadium.55 This exercise tested the security 
response to several simulated fixed-wing aircraft that violated the restricted airspace over 
Glendale in an attempt to improve response times and agency coordination to a real 
event.56  
The DHS and partner homeland security agencies aggressively use this red team 
technique in the preparation for NSSEs and SEAR Level 1 events. The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), as the lead emergency response agency for 
NSSEs, is traditionally tasked with coordinating, designing, and executing these 
exercises. These exercises provide leadership an opportunity to test the command and 
control capability of the numerous assets involved in the security of a major event. An 
example of a tabletop exercise can be seen in New York City during the preparation for 
the September 2015 papal visit, which was designated a NSSE. This exercise brought 
more than 48 different local, state, and federal agencies together to test the operational 
plan and identify weaknesses in response to five unique scenarios including an active 
                                                 




shooter, building collapse, major power outage, and a backpack improvised explosive 
device (IED).57 
A more robust simulation example can be seen in the USSS’ preparation for the 
2017 presidential inauguration at its training facility in Beltsville, Maryland in January 
2017. This red team simulation tested the agency on 40 different scenarios that could 
occur at various points along the historic parade route from the U.S. Capitol to the White 
House using dozens of agents, as well as roleplaying actors for the new president, first 
lady, and protestors.58 Agents were tested on a range of possible situations including 
medical emergencies, armed assaults, and even risks posed from unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs). This form of red team technique, whether in the form of tabletop 
exercises or full-scale simulations, is a significant part of the planning process for major 
events.  
The red team technique of simulation exercises provides major event security 
planners with significant benefits. First, simulations enable security planners to test lines 
of communication between multiple agencies that often do not work together. These 
exercises enable local, state, and federal agencies to test their response capabilities to 
staged emergencies under elevated stress levels. This ability to add stress to both 
individuals and security plans enables leadership to anticipate weaknesses better in the 
security operation with no risk to the public or to their personnel. Of the three main 
varieties of red team techniques discussed in this thesis, simulation exercises are the most 
commonly accepted and used in the design and execution of NSSE and SEAR 1 events.  
2. Red Team Techniques—Vulnerability Probes  
Vulnerability probes are a class of red teaming in which role playing adversaries 
attack active defense systems to identify weaknesses in physical or cyber security.59 This 
                                                 
57 J. David Goodman, “Pope’s Visit Poses a Security Test for New York,” The New York Times, 
September 14, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/15/nyregion/pope-francis-visit-prompts-security-
preparations-in-new-york.html?_r=0.  
58 Matthew Dean, “Secret Service Training in High Gear Ahead of Inauguration Day,” Fox News, 
January 13, 2017, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/01/13/secret-service-training-in-high-gear-ahead-
inauguration-day.html.  
59 Zenko, Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy, XXII.  
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technique is employed across the federal government, as well as the private sector and 
can be conducted covertly or as part of a designed exercise. A prominent example was 
the 2015 DHS Office of Inspector General’s probe of airport screening operations across 
the United States. Undercover agents successfully used disguises and false identities to 
smuggle fake weapons and explosives successfully past Transportation Security 
Administration screeners in 67 out 70 separate attempts.60 Similarly, in the cyber-world, 
this technique is being employed extensively by the DOD. The 2016 program, titled 
“Hack the Pentagon,” invited vetted civilians to attempt to discover vulnerabilities in the 
DOD’s public non-mission critical systems during a controlled timeframe. The DOD 
offers successful participants cash bounties and awards for discoveries that lead to 
improvements in government systems.61  
Unlike simulations, vulnerability probes have limited utility in the design and 
execution of security for major events for several reasons. First, NSSEs and SEAR Level 
1 events traditionally last a short time and require a full deployment of available 
resources to secure the event.62 Running a realistic vulnerability probe exercise during 
the actual event would draw limited resources away from a potential real-life incident 
response. Additionally, agencies and departments not familiar with each other’s 
procedures will be working in close proximity increased the potential for a “friendly fire” 
or “blue on blue” situation.  
Second, most major events involve significant numbers of attendees and non-
attendee crowds. In most instances, it would be difficult to recreate this environment in a 
realistic manner. Lastly, major event security often affects the local community and 
economy in a negative manner. Road closures, disruption of mass transit, and lost 
revenue to local businesses in or near the security perimeter are all likely second-order 
                                                 
60 Brian Bennett, “Red Team Agents Use Disguises, Ingenuity to Expose TSA Vulnerabilities,” Los 
Angeles Times, June 2, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/.  
61 “Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on DoD’s “Hack the Pentagon” Cybersecurity 
Initiative,” Release No: NR-070-16, March 2, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-
Release-View/Article/684106/statement-by-pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-on-dods-hack-the-penta 
gon-cybe.  
62 One notable exception might be a major event that lasts for a long period of time or in a remote 
location, such as the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah. In this circumstance, vulnerability 
probes may be a technique worth consideration.  
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consequences of major security events. An example of these effects can be seen in the 
2004 Democratic National Convention in Boston, Massachusetts. The major event 
location, The Fleet Center, was located within 40 feet of Interstate 93 and directly over a 
commuter train station responsible for moving 24,000 passengers daily.63 While these 
transportation routes were closed for the duration of the official event, closing them for a 
vulnerability test would present an additional hardship to the local community.  
3. Red Team Technique—Analytical Analysis  
Analytical analysis in the planning process requires the application of specific 
critical thinking techniques with the goal of improving overall decision making. The 
UFMCS curriculum contains dozens of different analytical techniques, but regardless of 
the type of technique used, red teams attempt to:  
Challenge facts and explicit assumptions, look for implicit (unstated) 
assumptions, identifying cultural assumptions and developing targeted 
cultural questions for subject matter experts, challenging the problem 
frame (and proposing alternative frames), identifying cognitive biases and 
symptoms of underlying groupthink.64  
The Joint Forces Doctrine, responsible for instructing all branches of the armed 
forces, recognizes the value of these techniques and their benefits:  
Command red teams help commanders and staffs think critically and 
creatively; challenge assumptions; mitigate groupthink; reduce risks by 
serving as a check against complacency and surprise; and increase 
opportunities by helping the staff see situations, problems, and potential 
solutions from alternative perspectives.65 
This variety of red teaming, unlike simulations and vulnerability probes, provides 
organizations with tremendous flexibility. Analytical techniques can be applied by an 
                                                 
63 Esther Scott, Security Planning for the 2004 Democratic National Convention (B) (Cambridge, MA: 
Kennedy School of Government, 2005).  
64 University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, The Applied Critical Thinking Handbook 
(formerly the Red Team Handbook), 3.  
65 United States Joint Force Development, Command Red Team (Joint Doctrine Note 1–16) 
(Washington, DC: United States Joint Force Development, 2016), http://dtic.mil/doctrine/notes/jdn1_ 
16.pdf.  
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individual or group, from ad hoc or permanent teams, formally or informally, and during 
various phases of the planning process.66  
An example of alternative analysis can be seen in the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s (CIA) Red Cell. In the days after the 9/11 attacks, the CIA formed a group of 
contrarian thinkers called the Red Cell designed to “challenge the conventional thinking 
within the intelligence community and mitigate the threat of additional strategic surprises 
through the use of alternative analysis.”67  
An alternative analysis technique introduced at the beginning of this chapter is the 
devil’s advocate. The use of an authentic devil’s advocate has been noted as an effective 
countermeasure to the effects of groupthink.68 Just like the papal version discussed in the 
beginning of this chapter, this technique requires a selected portion of the team to 
challenge weak assumptions and take a position opposite of the commonly held view. 
The U.S. military’s Joint Doctrine Note states the goal of the devil’s advocate as “to 
temporarily dismantle consensus, set aside preconceptions, and establish conditions that 
invite the staff to consider whether the problem is correctly framed.”69  
An example of the use of the devil’s advocate technique in government planning 
can be seen in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. President John F. Kennedy convened a 
small group of decision makers from the National Security Council to consider potential 
courses of action and then promptly removed himself from the decision-making process. 
Additionally, Attorney General Robert Kennedy was assigned to serve as the devil’s 
advocate and specifically presented contrary ideas to force the group to consider and 
debate all potential options.70 
                                                 
66 University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, The Applied Critical Thinking Handbook 
(formerly the Red Team Handbook), 4.  
67 Zenko, Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy, 91.  
68 Sunstein and Hastie, Wiser, 115–118.  
69 United States Joint Force Development, Command Red Team, IV–2.  
70 Ben Dattner, “Preventing “Groupthink”,” Psychology Today, April 20, 2011, https://www.psych 
ologytoday.com/blog/credit-and-blame-work/201104/preventing-groupthink.  
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Premortem analysis is a red team technique first proposed by Gary Klein in his 
1998 book, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, in which all group 
participants begin with the assumption that their proposed plan or operation has failed. 
Group members are then asked to identify and discuss potential reasons for that failure. 
This red team technique empowers participants to question the proposed operational plan 
and team assumptions. Premortem analysis: 
Legitimizes doubt according to Daniel Kahneman as well as encouraging 
all participants to search for threats to the proposed plan. According to 
The Applied Critical Thinking Handbook, this technique is effective 
because “the pull of groupthink, consensus, and a false sense of security is 
punctured, and is replaced by an active search aimed at preventing trouble 
later on.71  
This technique “breaks the course of action through a divergent process that encourages 
objectivity and skepticism.”72 
C. CONCLUSION  
The concepts and techniques of red teaming are being taught and increasingly 
used and accepted throughout the United States within the DOD, IC, and law 
enforcement community. While not all red team techniques are ideally suited for use in 
major event security design, the expanded use of analytical analysis has the potential to 
challenge organizational thought and assumptions. These techniques, however, need to be 
completed within the subcommittee framework used in the design and execution of 
security for major events.  
                                                 
71 University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, The Applied Critical Thinking Handbook 
(formerly the Red Team Handbook), 165. 
72 Ibid. 
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III. MAJOR SECURITY EVENTS—AN OVERVIEW 
Finally, the illusions of validity and skill are supported by a powerful 
professional culture. We know that people can maintain an unshakable 
faith in any proposition, however absurd, when they are sustained by a 
community of like-minded believers.73 
~ Daniel Kahneman  
 
Large national security events present U.S. homeland security professionals with 
planning, execution, and logistical challenges. The DHS takes a central role in classifying 
and designating events as either NSSE or SEAR level. This classification procedure can 
activate the full resources of the homeland security enterprise at all levels of government. 
This chapter addresses the historical origins and classification process of these events, as 
well as introducing the principal model for the planning and execution of major-event 
security planning.  
The executive steering committee and subcommittee model is the prevailing 
organizational and decision-making structure used in the development of security for 
NSSE and SEAR Level 1 events. The planning process and framework for these events 
share many similarities; consequently, several of the same decision-making challenges 
exist for both types of events. The executive steering and subcommittee model marshals 
tremendous amounts of resources and ensures that roles and responsibilities between 
dozens of local, state, and federal agencies are clearly defined, all through small 
subcommittees of critical decision makers. It is within these subcommittees that structural 
and individual biases can affect the effectiveness of major security planning.  
                                                 
73 Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 217.  
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A. NATIONAL SPECIAL SECURITY EVENTS  
Since the first NSSE in 1998, only 57 special events have received the official 
NSSE designation from the federal government.74 Types of events that historically 
receive this designation include presidential inaugurations, major political conventions, 
world leader summits, such as the 2012 World Leader Summit in Chicago, and State of 
the Union addresses to the U.S. Congress. The NSSE designation triggers numerous 
federal agencies to facilitate planning, but it also allows the federal government to 
provide direct funding to local and state agencies for support.75  
This designation is critical because the resources required to plan and execute 
these events far exceed the capabilities of individual federal agencies and would exhaust 
the resources of local and state agencies without specific funding. As an example, the 
U.S. Congress appropriated $50 million each for Cleveland, Ohio, and Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, to offset the security costs for the 2016 party conventions during the 
presidential election.76 This $100 million investment was paid directly to the local and 
state agencies through grants managed by the Department of Justice and FEMA.77  
The original framework responsible for the planning and execution of NSSEs was 
derived from the unclassified Presidential Decision Directive 62: Protection against 
Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas (PDD 62) in 1998. 
Initially, the decision to recommend that an event receive the NSSE designation was 
made by an interagency counterterrorism working group with the U.S. Attorney General 
                                                 
74 Total from 1998–2015 derived from United States Secret Service Memorandum dated February 12, 
2015, obtained through a FOIA request posted on https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-
10/list-of-national-special-security-events-15602/. Total from 2015 to February 1, 2017 was derived from 
the USSS website: https://www.secretservice.gov/index.shtml.  
75 The USSS has no authorization to reimburse expenses for local and state agencies directly for their 
support.  
76 R. Sam Garratt and Shawn Reese, Funding of Presidential Nominating Conventions: An Overview 
(CRS Report No R46937) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 6, https://fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/misc/R43976.pdf.  
77 Ibid., 5.  
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and Secretary of Treasury having final approval authority.78 The USSS was designated as 
the lead federal planning and coordination agency, the FBI was designated as the primary 
counterterrorism and intelligence agency, and FEMA was tasked with disaster 
management at the federal level.79 This directive provided the clear division of roles and 
responsibilities among the USSS, FBI, and FEMA that still exists today.80 After the 
founding of the DHS, this directive was updated by the 2002 Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), which codifies the Secretary of Homeland Security as 
the principal federal official for domestic incident management.81 The original division 
of responsibilities among the USSS, FBI, and FEMA remained unchanged by HSPD-5.  
The process by which an event receives the official designation of a NSSE begins 
when the governor of the host state contacts the Secretary of Homeland Security and 
requests that the event be evaluated. The host governor completes a written survey 
describing the event and the expected impact on the community. Once the DHS receives 
the request, the NSSE Steering Committee—composed of senior-level members of the 
USSS, FBI, FEMA, and other federal agencies—reviews the survey and makes a 
recommendation to the secretary.82 While no specific rules exist for when an event 
receives the official designation, the DHS considers several factors, including the 
anticipated attendance of U.S. officials and foreign dignitaries, attendees, guests, and the 
crowd, and the potential historical or symbolic significance of an event.83 Figure 1 
                                                 
78 The White House, Presidential Decision Directive NSC/62 (Washington, DC: The White House, 
1998), http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-62.pdf. Declassified on March 18, 2014. Since the inception of the 
Department of Homeland Security, the final approving authority now resides with the Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security. 
79 These agencies typically lead the planning committees in their respective area of responsibility, but 
purposeful overlap does exist to ensure some degree of redundancy.  
80 The Presidential Protection Act of 2000 codified the USSS’ role as the lead planning agency for 
events designated as NSSEs in Title 18, United States Code 3056.  
81 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Protection Directive 5—Management of 
Domestic Incidents (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2003), https://www.dhs.gov/ 
sites/default/files/publications/Homeland%20Security%20Presidential%20Directive%205.pdf. 
82 Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment Field Hearing, 
House of Representatives (2007) (written statement of Timothy J. Koerner, Assistant Director, United 
States Secret Service).  
83 Reese, National Special Security Events, 1.  
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outlines the decision-making process by which an event receives the official designation 
as a NSSE. 
 
Figure 1.  NSSE Designation Process. 
Once the DHS Secretary has designated an event a NSSE, the executive steering 
committee begins formal security planning.84  
B. SPECIAL EVENT ACTIVITY RATING LEVEL 1 EVENTS  
In 2004, the DHS developed a risk-based methodology for identifying and 
categorizing events not designated as NSSEs. The DHS and its Office of National 
Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) developed the Special Event Working 
Group (SEWG) to assess events utilizing a methodological approach to risk. The SEWG 
consists of senior-level members from more than 50 federal agencies and is co-chaired by 
the NPPD, FBI, USSS, FEMA, and the DHS Office of Protection Coordination.85 This 
group uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative data in an attempt to reduce 
subjectivity and improve consistency in ratings. Figure 2 shows the process by which the 
SEAR system reviews and classified events.  
                                                 
84 Planning often begins before the official designation has been received for events that have a high 
likelihood for approval, such as presidential inauguration and presidential funerals.  
85 Department of Homeland Security, “Special Events Working Group” (lecture, online Fusion Talk, 
Department of Homeland Security, July 27, 2016).  
 29 
 
Figure 2.  Special Events Rating Process. 
Each year, states are invited to submit their events to the DHS in the National 
Special Events Data Call.86 The NPPD and their SEWG assess each event utilizing a 
risk-based methodology and issue a SEAR from 1 to 5 in descending order of perceived 
risk. Figure 3 shows examples of events and their SEAR level.  
 
Figure 3.  Examples of SEAR Events at Each Level.87 
SEAR events rated a 1 and 2 are assigned a principal federal coordinator and 
potentially an assistant federal coordinator responsible for coordinating the federal assets 
                                                 
86 Ibid.  
87 Source: Department of Homeland Security, “Special Events Working Group.” 
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and support for these events and representing the Secretary of Homeland Security.88 
SEAR events rated 4 or 5 receive virtually no federal support, as they have been deemed 
outside the level of national significance.89 No matter the SEAR rating, and the eventual 
level of federal support, the overall coordination and responsibility for the design and 
security resides with the local and state agencies. Once the SEWG has issued a SEAR 
level, all planning and coordination is transferred to the local area and to the executive 
steering committee responsible for each event.  
C. EXECUTIVE STEERING COMMITTEE AND SUBCOMMITTEE 
PLANNING PROCESS  
Once an event has received the NSSE designation or been rated as a SEAR Level 
1, the executive steering committee and subcommittee planning process begins. Unlike 
NSSEs, membership in SEAR Level 1 event committees and subcommittees traditionally 
is composed primarily of local and state government agencies. The planning cycle 
timeline varies by location and complexity of the event but is usually longer than 12 
months.90 As an example, the security planning for the 2012 Democratic National 
Convention in Charlotte, North Carolina, began 19 months in advance of the event’s start 
date.91  
NSSE executive steering committees traditionally consist of the principal federal 
coordinator, USSS, FBI, FEMA, private partner entities, host city and state senior-law 
                                                 
88 Homeland Security Presidential Directive–5 designates the Secretary of Homeland Security as the 
principal federal coordinator for all domestic incident management. The Secretary then delegates this 
responsibility.  
89 Please refer to James Gehring, “Sports Venue Security: Public Policy Options for SEAR 4–5 
Events” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014) for an excellent overview on the risks to SEAR 
4 and 5; the premise being that NSSEs and Level 1 events are hardened targets and terrorists will be forced 
to target the less well-protected Level 4 and 5 events.  
90 Planning timelines vary by the type of event and can range from years (2002 Olympic Games in Salt 
Lake City, Utah) to days (U.S. Presidential funerals, such as the 2006 funeral of Former President Gerald 
Ford).  
91 Vivian Chu and Tammy Felix, Command, Control, and Coordination: A Quick-Look Analysis of the 
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Police Department’s Operations During the 2012 Democratic National Convention 
(IQR-2013-U-004229) (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance and 
Alexandria, VA: CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2013), 45, https://www.bja.gov/Publications/2012-DNC-
Quick-Look.pdf.  
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enforcement, fire, and emergency management officials.92 The purpose of these steering 
committees is to identify priority risks and organize subcommittees to address specific 
areas of concern. Each unique subcommittee reports to the executive steering committee 
ultimately responsible for approving its operational plan.  
For example, the 2012 Republican National Convention held in Tampa, Florida, 
and the 2012 Democratic National Convention in Charlotte, North Carolina, each had 24 
individual planning subcommittees reporting back to the overall executive steering 
committees.93 This approach to managing assets and organizations ensures that roles and 
responsibilities are clearly defined and minimizes the chance for duplication of efforts.  
The following list outlines the subcommittees that participated in the 2012 
Republican National Convention in Tampa:  
 
1. Airport       13. Health/Medical  
2. Airspace Security     14. Intelligence/Counterterrorism  
3. Civil Disturbance     15. Interagency Communications  
4. Consequence Management    16. Legal/Civil Liberties  
5. Counter Surveillance     17. Logistics/ Asset Identification  
6. Credentialing      18. Public Affairs  
7. Crisis Management     19. Staffing and Housing 
8. Critical Infrastructure Protection   20. Tactical  
9. Crowd Management     21. Technology  
10. Dignitary/VIP Protection    22. Training  
11. Explosive Device Response    23. Transportation/Traffic  
12. Fire/Life Safety/Hazardous Materials  24. Venue Security94 
 
Each NSSE subcommittee has a chair and several co-chairs consisting of a 
member of the USSS, another federal agency with specific subject-matter expertise, and a 
                                                 
92 The committees for NSSE and SEAR Level 1 events have a slightly different composition; 
however, the framework is the same. As an example, the USSS usually plays no direct planning role in 
SEAR Level 1 events.  
93 Denise Rodriguez-King and Tammy Felix, Command, Control, and Coordination: A Quick-Look 
Analysis of the Tampa Police Department’s Operations During the 2012 Republican National Convention 
(IQR-2013-U-004228) (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance and 




local or state law enforcement representative with critical knowledge of the local 
community.  
The subcommittees for SEAR Level 1 events are similar in scope, but are staffed 
primarily by local and state homeland security officials. It is specifically within these 
subcommittees that the majority of operational, tactical, and strategic planning occurs for 
major events.  
D. SUBCOMMITTEE MODEL—INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL 
DECISION-MAKING TRAPS  
The subcommittee process employed in the planning of security for major events 
is vulnerable to decision-making errors, biases, and institutional blindness. This section 
analyzes the organizational framework of major event security subcommittees and 
identifies both institutional and individual decision-making errors.  
1. Institutional—Groupthink  
The security subcommittees operate in a framework specifically designed to 
separate decision makers according to areas of specialization. While this organizational 
structure is effective in breaking up the otherwise overwhelming amount of work and 
defining areas of responsibility, it also limits, or insulates, each subcommittee from each 
other. This information “silo effect” minimizes the exposure of subject-matter experts 
and can lead to planning gaps between subcommittees.  
NSSEs and SEAR Level 1 events are held in a set of geographic locations 
throughout the country on a random rotating basis.95 In most instances, specifically in 
NSSEs, representatives from the USSS, FBI, or FEMA chair or co-chair these 
committees. These representatives are selected from a very small group of individuals 
and often complete more than one event in a career. The great majority of planners on the 
subcommittees are participating in their first major security event with the exception of 
these USSS, FBI, and FEMA representatives. These planners, by virtue of their real or 
                                                 
95 Notable exceptions include the District of Columbia (State of the Union address and Presidential 
Inaugurations) and New York City, New York (United Nations General Assembly annual meetings).  
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perceived historical experience, may inadvertently stifle open debate and critical thinking 
by all members of the subcommittee.  
Committee members may defer to the “expert” planner’s thoughts and opinions 
out of social pressure, or conversely, the opinions and ideas of less experienced planners 
may not receive proper consideration. Ephraim Kam explored the relation between 
“expert” and “non-expert” decision makers in the intelligence community in his 1988 
book, Surprise Attack: A Victim’s Perspective. In Kam’s analysis of 11 major surprise 
attacks, he posited, “Experts within an organization tend to reject non-experts’ warnings 
and opinions, the experts’ argument is that they are in the best position to evaluate 
information and developments.”96 A chair and co-chair participant’s firmly held opinions 
could have an oversized influence that could steer the group to a poor decision.  
While the organizational framework for major events is well established, no 
formal process is in place for the development of security plans for NSSEs and SEAR 
Level 1 events within the individual subcommittees. Each subcommittee is responsible 
for designing a formal plan and providing it to the executive steering committee with a 
formal plan; however, the system by which decisions are made depends entirely on the 
committee chairs. Janis refers to this absence of planning process as a “lack of norms 
requiring methodical procedures in decision-making.”97 If Janis is correct, this lack of a 
methodical decision-making process could lead to groupthink within the security 
subcommittee. With no formal process to evaluate and consider various points of view, a 
subcommittee chair may simply ignore or discount contrarian thoughts and ideas.  
The final and most critical structural antecedent of groupthink is the overall 
homogeneity of the subcommittee members. Essentially, the more esprit de corps a group 
possesses, the greater the danger of groupthink.98 Esprit de corps is typically considered 
a positive trait for law enforcement agencies because it promotes discipline and 
                                                 
96 Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: A Victim’s Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1988), 161.  
97 Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decision and Fiascos, 244.  
98 Ibid., 245.  
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camaraderie; yet, it creates a sense of “us versus them.”99 This division could be 
composed of the actual entire subcommittee, a small group within the subcommittee, or 
even the agency itself. Additionally, members of a particular agency may not want to risk 
offending a partner-agency’s representative and allow an otherwise objectionable 
decision to proceed uncontested.  
Major security event subcommittees traditionally consist of members of local, 
state, and federal law enforcement, fire and life safety, and military organizations. An 
example would be fire and life safety personnel perceiving law enforcement officials as 
outsiders, and therefore, deserving of lower status within the group. Additionally, 
members of local and state law enforcement departments may resist ideas presented by 
“outside” federal authorities. This perceived lower status of the sub-group within the 
committee could lead to an imbalance in the decision-making process and greater 
importance placed on the thoughts of the “in-group” members. 
2. Individual—Heuristics and Planning Fallacies  
Ideally, homeland security professionals wish to control and know as many 
planning variables as possible when designing the security for a major event. Many 
critical factors are simply unknown or are only partially known during the design of 
security plans. Planners can anticipate the total number of attendees to an affair based on 
the size of the venue and historical documentation, but it is only one piece of the puzzle. 
Additional factors include the time of the crowd’s arrival, as well as the direction of 
travel when approaching and departing the event. In this grey area of planning, 
individuals often resort to mental shortcuts, or heuristics, to “fill in the blanks.” These 
heuristics can be helpful, but can lead to faulty and systemic planning assumptions and 
errors.100  
                                                 
99 Ricciutti, “Groupthink: A Significant Threat to the Homeland Security of the United States.”   
100 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” 
Science 185, no. 4157 (September 27, 1974): 1124.  
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E. AVAILABILITY HEURISTIC  
The availability heuristic is a mental shortcut used by individuals when 
considering questions about probability.101 Decision makers assume an event is more 
likely to occur if a similar event has recently happened or is easy to recall regardless of 
contradictory information. One example would be making decisions based on the desire 
to avoid “another 9/11.” This process leads to planning for events that have a very low 
likelihood of occurring based solely on the ease of which a similar event can be recalled.  
This heuristic is also closely related to the concept of anchoring and adjusting. 
Anchoring is the process by which individuals make estimates on starting values and 
adjust from this initial value as more complete information becomes available.102 Initial 
estimates, or starting points, can be formed after reviewing the circumstances 
surrounding an event or historical knowledge, but Tversky and Kahneman suggest that 
future adjustments are often insufficient and demonstrate a bias toward the initial starting 
point regardless of new information.103 
F. REPRESENTATIVENESS HEURISTIC  
A second individual heuristic that can negatively impact decision makers in major 
security events is the representativeness heuristic. Tversky and Kahneman define this 
heuristic as follows, “When A is highly representative of B, the probability that A 
originates from B is judged to be high.”104 This mental shortcut leads decision makers to 
wrongly predict the chances of a low probability event by drawing comparisons to other 
similar events.105 This heuristic can lead to security planners overstating potential risk 
and focusing limited resources on highly unlikely events. Inversely, this heuristic can 
lead planners to make false assumptions about their events when comparing them to 
similar events from recent past. This concept is important to consider for events that 
                                                 
101 Sunstein and Hastie, Wiser, 44–45.  
102 Tversky and Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” 1128.  
103 Ibid.  
104 Ibid., 1124.  
105 Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, 151.  
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periodically occur in the same geographic location, such as the United Nations General 
Assembly in New York City, the annual State of the Union Address to Congress, and the 
presidential inauguration held every four years in Washington, DC. Additionally, 
agencies and departments may assign the same personnel for these events from one year 
to another paradoxically increasing the chances of both the representativeness and 
availability heuristics creeping into the planning for events. 
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IV. MAJOR SECURITY PLANNING—2009 PRESIDENTIAL 
INAUGURATION  
They had months to prepare. … And their planning was woefully 
inadequate and put thousands of people at risk.106 
~ Anonymous Purple Tunnel Victim  
 
This chapter introduces a case study into the crowd-management issues that 
plagued the 2009 presidential inauguration. This case study also provides a glimpse into 
the complexity and multi-faceted process in which major event security is designed and 
executed. 
On November 4, 2008, Senator Barack Obama was elected as the 44th President 
of the United States. Although his inauguration would not occur until January 2009, the 
USSS had begun initial planning and coordination as far back as May 2008 for the 
event.107 Media outlets estimated that approximately two million people would converge 
on Washington, DC, the U.S. Capitol grounds, and the National Mall to witness the 
historic Obama inauguration.108 These attendance estimates far surpassed the 2005 
presidential inauguration crowd of 400,000, and if true, would be the largest crowd to 
ever attend an inauguration or any other event in the District of Columbia.109 
                                                 
106 Laura Rozen, “Purple Tunnel of Doom After-action Report: “Survivors” Offer Lessons Learned,” 
Foreign Policy, January 21, 2009, http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/01/21/purple-tunnel-of-doom-after-action-
report-survivors-offer-lessons-learned/.  
107 United States Secret Service, Multi-Agency Response to Concerns Raised by the Joint 
Congressional Committee on the Inaugural Ceremonies for the 56th Presidential Inauguration 
(Washington, DC: United States Secret Service, 2009), 7. This report was initially marked For Official Use 
Only (FOUO); however, a redacted version was released to the public subsequent to a Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) request on March 19, 2010.  
108 Lauren Kornreich, “Arrive Early, Wear Comfy Shoes on Inauguration Day,” CNN, January 19, 
2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/TRAVEL/01/18/inauguration.travel/index.html. Event planners made the 
decision to open the entire National Mall to attendees. Individuals did not need a ticket and were not 
security screened in this area.  
109 “Official Inauguration Crowd Estimate: 1.8 Million,” January 22, 2009, http://politicalticker.blogs. 
cnn.com/2009/01/22/official-inauguration-crowd-estimate-18-million/.  
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U.S. intelligence agency assessments posited that the inauguration would be an 
appealing target for domestic and international terrorists due in part to the swearing in of 
the nation’s first African-American president.110 The protection of the attendees and the 
ceremony marking the nation’s peaceful transition of power needed the full resources of 
local, state, and federal homeland security agencies. Despite months of planning and 
years of experience in securing similar events, several thousand ticket holders who 
arrived in Washington never made it into the inauguration ceremony.111 These ticketed 
guests were not able to arrive at the checkpoints for entry into the event because of a 
confluence of factors that should have been anticipated during the planning process.  
A. AMERICA’S PEACEFUL TRANSITION OF POWER  
The swearing-in ceremony was scheduled to begin at 11:30 a.m. on January 20, 
2009, on the West Front of the U.S. Capitol complex. Months of security coordination, 
walk-throughs, and planning between dozens of different local, state, federal, and DOD 
agencies, as well as staff and private entities, were now complete. A full-scale practice 
inauguration, complete with actors playing the president and first lady, was held in 
advance to ensure that all staff and military entities knew their exact role and to practice 
the coordination and timing required for the historic event.112 The Executive Steering 
Committee (ESC) conducted and completed several tabletop exercises that tested the 
strength of the security plan in the weeks leading up to the event.113 On January 11, 2009, 
the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies (JCCIC) published a news 
release with detailed instructions for attendees including a map of the downtown area 
with recommended mass transportation options, entry locations, and security-related 
                                                 
110 The Associated Press, “Feds Say Inauguration an Attractive Terrorist Target,” NBC News, January 
7, 2009, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/28547871/ns/politics-inauguration/t/feds-say-inauguration-attractive-
terrorist-target/#.V_k1wsZFDIU.  
111 Robin Abcarian, “They Came for the Inauguration but Got Stuck in a Tunnel,” The Los Angeles 
Times, January 23, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/23/nation/na-angry-inauguration-goers23.  
112 Michael E. Ruane and Nikita Stewart, “Practice Inauguration Lacks Some Pomp and the VIPs,” 
The Washington Post, January 12, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/ 
11/AR2009011100625.html?sid=ST2009011102548. This practice focused on the ceremonial events of the 
inauguration and did not include an activation of the security component.  
113 United States Secret Service, Multi-Agency Response to Concerns Raised by the Joint 
Congressional Committee on the Inaugural Ceremonies for the 56th Presidential Inauguration, 8.  
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information designed to assist those attending the event.114 The Washington Metropolitan 
Area Transit Authority (WMATA) coordinated bus and Metro rail service to begin at 
4:00 a.m. to accommodate the unprecedented crowds coming into Washington, DC.115  
The U.S. Capitol Subcommittee, one of the 23 unique security subcommittees 
working in unison to protect the NSSE, was responsible for the security planning for all 
events held on the grounds of the Capitol including the swearing in ceremony. The 
subcommittee was chaired by the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) and co-chaired by the 
USSS. The challenge for this group was the immense crowd that would descend upon the 
Capitol and ensuring that those ticketed guests could be security screened within the 
allotted time.  
The USSS was responsible for the planning, preparing, and conducting all 
screening operations on the Capitol grounds.116 The agency, relying on historical 
experience both from previous inaugurations and other major events, planned to use 
walk-through magnetometers. The USSS established a screening rate of 700 guests per 
hour for the purple section having the knowledge of the exact number of ticketed 
guests.117 The U.S. Capitol Security Subcommittee designed and implemented a new 
“metering” system to ensure the crowd would flow into the security screening areas in a 
controlled manner. This system was designed to ensure that the screening area would not 
be overrun by a large crowd and to minimize the potential for injury to members of the 
crowd.  
B. THE PURPLE TUNNEL OF DOOM  
Only 241,738 lucky attendees received a dedicated color-coded ticket to the 
historic ceremony at the Capitol.118 Ticket colors coincided with designated seating and 
                                                 
114 See Figure 1.  
115 “Metro Outlines Inauguration Day Service Plans,” accessed December 22, 2016, https://www.wm 
ata.com/about/news/pressreleasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=2350.   
116 United States Secret Service, Multi-Agency Response to Concerns Raised by the Joint 
Congressional Committee on the Inaugural Ceremonies for the 56th Presidential Inauguration, 12.  
117 Ibid., 15.  
118 Ibid., 11. The rest of the crowd would not need a ticket to observe the swearing-in ceremony or 
parade and space was not reserved.  
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standing areas around the Capitol: yellow (19,269), orange (17,469), blue (52,500), 
purple (52,500), and silver (100,000).119 A map of the Capitol grounds and color-coded 
gates are shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4.  JCCIC Map of the U.S. Capitol on Inauguration Day.120 
                                                 
119 United States Secret Service, Multi-Agency Response to Concerns Raised by the Joint 
Congressional Committee on the Inaugural Ceremonies for the 56th Presidential Inauguration, 11.  
120 Source: Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies, JCCIC Releases Map and 
Ticket Information for Inaugural Swearing-In Ceremonies (Washington, DC: Joint Congressional 
Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies, 2009), http://www.wmata.com/getting_around/metro_events/ticket-
map_release.pdf. 
 41 
A dedicated color-coded entry and security screening location was prepared to 
open and begin entry of the ticketed public at the published time of 8:00 a.m. or as soon 
as the security searches of the U.S. Capitol were complete or whichever occurred first.121 
In reality, the purple gate was officially open for screening at 7:33 a.m. and did not close 
until almost 12:00 p.m.122 
Security planners were aware of the exact number of ticketed guests who would 
need to be screened and the allotted time to complete this task to ensure all ticketed 
attendees were inside the viewing zone. Despite these known factors, crowd entry 
complaints began before President Obama took the official Oath of Office, as calls and 
emails poured into various command posts across the city.123 Social media websites 
erupted with posts from ticket holders who never made it into the event despite waiting in 
line for hours in the near-freezing temperatures.124 
According to media reports the day after the inauguration, several thousand 
purple-ticket holders were stuck in line for hours in the 3rd Street, N.W., underground 
tunnel located between Constitution Avenue and Independence Avenue and did not gain 
entry into the Capitol events.125 Within one day, a Facebook page entitled “Survivors of 
the Purple Tunnel of Doom” formed and had more than 1,000 members.126 This page 
grew in membership to over 5,000 members in less than one week.127 Comments on this 
                                                 
121 United States Secret Service, Multi-Agency Response to Concerns Raised by the Joint 
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Facebook page described the problem and provided dozens of first-person accounts of the 
crowd management issues.  
Arrived at 6:30 am. DIRECTED INTO THE TUNNEL BY TWO 
POLICE OFFICERS WHO CHECKED OUR TICKETS. Waited, waited, 
waited with the 1000s of others. No police, no volunteers, no porta-potties, 
no water, no food. Inched forward with increasingly agitated, though 
civilized, mob.128 
I was among the thousands of purple ticket holders who had their 
Inaugural dreams dashed away by poor planning, lack of official personnel 
and an overall logistical failure by the police departments (many from out 
of town and had absolutely no information), the Inaugural Committee and 
Secret Service.129 
We had purple tickets and arrived at the line around 7:50 AM. Seven of 
my friends and I were crushed in a dangerous mob in a 15 degree chill for 
five hours at D and first Sts. NW. We probably moved ten feet within the 
course of two hours at one point. There was absolutely zero crowd control. 
We witnessed old people, people in wheelchairs, and children all being 
crushed.130 
Public outrage grew as the story of the thousands of stranded guests received an 
increasing amount of media attention in the aftermath of the inauguration. On January 21, 
2009, Senator Dianne Feinstein, Chair of the JCCIC, officially requested that the USSS 
as the NSSE planning lead convene a multi-agency investigation into the events 
surrounding the crowd management at the U.S. Capitol. Senator Feinstein requested this 
investigation specifically to review the 3rd Street tunnel “where thousands of people were 
stuck for several hours and apparently without any law enforcement presence.”131 Not 
only did these ticketed guests not gain entry into the event, but they were placed into a 
situation that could have devolved into a dangerous public safety issue. Despite the 
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activation of the full force of the homeland security enterprise, this event was marred by 
the failure to consider the behavior of an integral piece of the security puzzle: the crowd.  
C. ASSUMPTION—THE ENEMY OF SECURITY PLANNING  
The USSS, in conjunction with the USCP, United States Park Police, and the 
Metropolitan Police Department, completed the requested Congressional report in March 
2009 and outlined several planning and execution errors that led to the crowd-
management issues during the inauguration.132 This report examined several factors of 
the crowd management issue to include the number of magnetometers, amount of time 
per individual search, and the size of the physical openings at each gate to determine why 
these guests did not gain entry into the event.133  
This report advised that no checkpoints were closed at the U.S. Capitol due to 
lack of space available inside the event.134 This situation indicates that the system of 
screening and admitting ticketed guests had broken down. The failure to anticipate the 
number of non-ticketed guests who migrated into the security screening area was 
“drastically underestimated by planners.”135 Removing these non-ticketed guests from 
the queue required additional time in the sorting and screening process and kept large 
numbers of ticketed crowds from reaching the screening locations. Additionally, this 
significant increase in the crowd surrounding the entry points forced people to migrate 
into the 3rd Street tunnel where no law enforcement, medical, or restroom services were 
staged to support them.  
The subcommittee focused its planning and attention on screening ticketed guests 
to gain entrance into the event and expressed concerns to the ESC and the JCCIC about 
the space available inside the secure area on the Capitol.136 This subcommittee, however, 
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never anticipated the behavior of the larger non-ticketed crowd on the outside of this 
secured event. Planners on this subcommittee had never seen a crowd as big as the one 
that descended on the District that day and simply had no historical frame of reference for 
its potential behavior. Previous inaugurations’ security plans provided little assistance, 
and in fact, may have proved to be an impediment to the crowd management planning by 
cementing assumptions on the behavior of the non-ticketed crowd.  
The crowd management failure that affected the 2009 presidential inauguration 
exemplified several of the observable consequences studied by Janis. By not factoring the 
behavior of the crowd, both ticketed and non-ticketed, the planners failed to examine the 
potential risks to their plan. Additionally, they demonstrated an incomplete survey of 
alternates by using the exact same screening locations from previous inaugurations even 
when the crowd size was expected to be significantly larger than the 2005 presidential 
inauguration. This failure to examine options, consequences, and risk is a hallmark of 
poor decision making and groupthink.  
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V. RED TEAM PITFALLS AND TRAPS  
I will look at any additional evidence to confirm the opinion to which I 
have already come.137 
~ Lord Hugh Molson 
 
This chapter identifies methods and techniques that could have been employed to 
assist in identifying the crowd management issues that marred the 2009 presidential 
inauguration. The techniques of red team analysis can challenge planning assumptions, 
reveal overlooked vulnerabilities and opportunities, identify second- and third-order 
effects, and provide alternative courses of action to planners.138 These potential benefits, 
however, are only derived and maximized when the process of red teaming is completed 
in a structured and formal process conducted by trained and educated professionals.139 
Several “best practices” and pitfalls have been identified in the execution of red teaming 
as well. This chapter introduces those implementation difficulties that exist and outline 
ways in which red team techniques can be marginalized.  
A. THE PURPLE TUNNEL OF DOOM—ANALYTICAL RED TEAM 
TECHNIQUES  
With the benefit of hindsight, the 2009 presidential inauguration crowd 
management errors seem clear. Ample warning was given that the overall crowd size 
would be at historic levels and that the number of ticketed guests who would actually 
attend the swearing in ceremony would be higher than a typical inauguration.140 Planners 
relied on their historical knowledge base and made adjustments to security procedures to 
accommodate the increased crowd.141 Relying on previous inauguration plans and 
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experiences gained through other major events proved little value and may have actually 
hindered the group’s ability to consider unique risks and recognize planning assumptions. 
Would the application of analytical red team techniques to the inauguration planning 
process have improved the results of the 2009 presidential inauguration? 
Two analytical red team techniques that could have potentially been used in the 
subcommittee process for this event are the devil’s advocate and the premortem analysis, 
both of which were introduced in Chapter II. The devil’s advocate role, whether officially 
designated or developed organically, would serve to counter assumptions made by the 
group. In this particular event, the assumption on the number of non-ticketed guests who 
would attempt to gain entry into the ceremony was significantly underestimated.142 The 
devil’s advocate would ideally challenge that assumption and attempt to convince the 
overall group of the potential for a larger crowd that would be too dense to allow for 
ticketed guests to enter the screening area.  
A premortem analysis would involve the entire planning subcommittee and would 
push each member to consider ways in which the event would fail. The expected historic 
crowd size was a significant concern and allowing the group the freedom to consider 
failure might have led to this issue being identified prior to the event itself instead of 
when it was too late to make a meaningful adjustment.  
Like all red team techniques, these two proposed analytical options require 
members to be open to feedback and adjustment for the suggestions to be of value. Even 
with the adoption of one or both of these analytical techniques, it remains unclear if the 
suggestions and concerns identified would have been accepted and implemented by 
agency leadership. Conceptually, the potential for red team analysis to be impactful to 
major-event security planning is present, but these techniques can be difficult to execute.  
B. RED TEAM EXECUTION TRAP  
While no formal quantitative study has been completed on the efficacy of red 
team techniques within DOD operations, several “best practices” and pitfalls have been 
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identified.143 These execution traps need to be considered prior to the formal adoption of 
these techniques into the security planning for major events, as each has the potential to 
reduce the overall effectiveness of red teaming.  
1. Acceptance by Senior Leadership  
The senior leaders of an agency or department must be open to challenge and 
criticism. For many agencies, this process is difficult as decision-making biases are 
inherently difficult to self-identify for organizational and individual reasons. 
Organizations experienced in “grading their own homework” may resist having their 
planning decisions exposed to outside review and criticism.144 Leadership must 
understand that the operation suffers from vulnerabilities that can potentially be 
minimized through the use of red team techniques.145 Senior management must also 
provide the necessary resources and access to planners for red teaming to be valuable. In 
many instances, organizations only embrace analytical red teaming after a significant 
error or event has occurred. In the days after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the CIA formed 
a group of contrarian thinkers called the Red Cell, which was designed to provide 
alternative analysis.146 
An example of red teaming not accepted by senior management can be seen in the 
FAA and highlighted in Zenko’s Red Team. The FAA instituted a small red team to 
conduct threat and vulnerability assessments only after the Pan Am 103 bombing over 
Lockerbie, Scotland that killed 270 passengers in 1988.147 This small red team, often 
consisting of only four or five total agents, was tasked with conducting vulnerability 
probes and assessments at domestic and international airports.148 This team was formed 
with “no foundational mission statement or guidance document” to “govern the conduct 
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of the red team’s operations, the scope of its activities, or the management of its 
findings.”149  
Red team members consistently identified vulnerabilities in airports and 
forwarded their results to the senior leadership of the FAA and to the associate 
administrator of the Office of the Civil Aviation Security (CAS). These organizations had 
the authority to levy fines and order remedial action as a result of the red team findings. 
Despite identifying significant vulnerabilities in airports around the world and reporting 
them to their senior leadership, little or no significant upgrades were made from 1991 
until 2001. Red team members, frustrated by years of inaction, took their results to the 
U.S. News & World Report and provided detailed information for a magazine article that 
appeared in February 2001.150  
The FAA red team was disbanded just days after the events of 9/11 with at least 
one team member filing a whistleblower disclosure with the Office of Special Counsel 
against his agency.151 The FAA red team identified significant security vulnerabilities in 
aviation security; however, senior leadership was either unwilling or unable to make 
significant improvements prior to the events of 9/11. An organization must recognize the 
critical nature of red teaming to benefit fully from this technique prior to spending 
significant amounts of time, energy, and resources on poorly conceived plans.  
2. Proper Team Composition and Staffing  
Second, organizations should properly recruit, select, and train individuals to 
participate in red teaming activities. The ability to think creatively and communicate 
potentially negative findings effectively are unique skills improved with formal training 
and experience. To be sure, divergent thinking is often not appreciated in such 
hierarchical institutions as the armed forces and law enforcement.152 “Your ability to 
mind read is more praiseworthy than your ability to think critically” according to a 
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United States Marine Corps red team officer quoted in Zenko’s book, Red Team. 
Individuals might resist questioning the status quo out of fear of risking career 
advancement or simply because they are so ingrained in the corporate culture that they 
lack the ability to see outside the organizational framework. A poorly staffed red team 
may actually only further solidify agencies’ organizational assumptions and provide false 
confidence in a plan not truly evaluated critically. 
3. Red Team Independence  
Third, the leadership of an operation must invite red team participants into each 
phase of the planning process and provide them with support to express ideas that might 
not be embraced throughout the organization.153 This support is in the form of access to 
key decision makers, proper resources, personnel, and authority to complete the 
assessment.154 The team must have independence from the main body that they are 
evaluating or risk being made subordinate to the overall organization.155 Without 
independence, the red team process can be manipulated to support a predetermined 
desired result and become a rubber stamp on policies and programs. An example of this 
rubber stamp can be seen in the way President Lyndon B. Johnson used the devil’s 
advocate technique during the Vietnam War to give the appearance of authentic debate. 
Under Secretary of State George Ball expressed dissent to the escalation of bombing in 
North Vietnam in senior-level meetings and his contrarian view was explained away by 
President Johnson as merely the result of his assuming the devil’s advocate role.156 Once 
Bell left his position in the State Department, President Johnson reassigned the devil’s 
advocate role to senior aide Bill Moyers; however, this reassignment was merely to give 
the appearance of true debate.157 According to Johnson’s press secretary George Reedy, 
“objections and cautions are discounted before they are delivered. They are actually 
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welcomed because they prove for the record that decision was preceded by 
controversy.”158 
Another example of the need for red team independence is the 2002 U.S. Joint 
Forces Command (JFCOM) war game Millennium Challenge 02 (MC), highlighted in 
Malcom Gladwell’s 2005 book, Blink: The Power of Thinking without Thinking. This 
unscripted exercise was designed to be a combination of advanced computer model 
simulation and actual troop and equipment movements in the field occurring in real-time 
and involving over 13,500 service members at a cost of $250 million.159 The Pentagon 
designed this exercise in anticipation that the future of warfare would be less 
conventional and the nation’s adversaries would recognize the futility of engaging the 
United States in direct military conflict.160 The MC was designed to test the U.S. 
military’s ability to wage war against a non-traditional threat. Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld stated the goal of the MC was to “help us create a force that is not only 
interoperable, responsive, agile and lethal, but one that is capable of capitalizing on the 
information revolution and the advanced technologies that are available today.”161  
This exercise pitted the United States (Blue Team) against a fictitious rogue 
military commander somewhere in the Persian Gulf (Red Team) in the year 2007.162 
Blue Team commanders were provided with intelligence and almost every technological 
and military capability in the U.S. arsenal.163 The simulation exercise began with the 
Blue Team issuing an eight-point ultimatum to the Red Team including a demand for full 
surrender.164 Instead of diplomatically negotiating with the far superior military Blue 
                                                 
158 George Reedy, The Twilight of a Presidency (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing Company, 1970), 
11.  
159 Zenko, Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy, 52–53.  
160 Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking without Thinking (New York: Back Bay Books, 
2005), 104. 
161 Jim Garamone, “Rumsfeld Visits Millennium Challenge Exercise,” American Forces Press 
Service, July 29, 2002, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/07/mil-020729-
dod01.htm.  
162 Although not specifically stated in formal planning documents, the Red Team was largely 
understood by exercise participants to represent Iraq or Iran.  
163 Gladwell, Blink, 105.  
164 Zenko, Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy, 55.  
 51 
Team, the Red Team launched a preemptive attack on U.S. naval ships as soon as it 
entered the Persian Gulf. Within 10 minutes, the Red Team overwhelmed the Blue Navy 
and sank 19 ships using techniques far from modern. The Red Team used a combination 
of “a barrage of missiles from ground-based launchers, commercial ships, and planes 
flying low and without radio communications to reduce radar signature.”165 The 
opposing force also used speedboats packed with explosives to conduct suicide missions 
against the U.S. fleet with tremendous success.166 The Blue Team cut all fiber optic and 
microwave communication capability in an attempt to force the Red Team to rely upon 
easily intercepted cellular and satellite communications.167 The Red Team responded by 
switching their communications to couriers on motorcycles completely negating the Blue 
Team’s technological advantage.168 With the Red Team inflicting massive and 
unexpected damage on the Blue Team on the first day of the exercise, the overall 
commanders felt like they had no choice but to reset the simulation.  
They began issuing orders to the Red Team limiting its operational capabilities, 
which, in turn, made its responses fully predictable to Blue Team commanders. The Red 
Team commander, a retired U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant General, stepped down mid-
simulation as the exercise became more scripted.169 
At the conclusion of the exercise, the Blue Team achieved a convincing simulated 
victory, but not without controversy. The Red Team commander completed a report upon 
the conclusion of this simulation expressing concern that this exercise was “controlled 
and how the exercise could lead the Pentagon to have misplaced confidence in what were 
still-untested military war-fighting concepts.”170 This massive simulation was designed 
to test the American military’s ability to fight in unconventional warfare; however, the 
lack of independence in the Red Team minimized the potential benefits of this exercise.  
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C. CONCLUSION  
Mark Mateski of The Red Team Journal states that an expert red team has the 
“ability to help expose a decision-maker’s blinders, preconceptions, and biases.”171 
These techniques have the potential to enhance the security planning for major events, 
but these improvements are only derived when conducted by trained individuals and for 
organizations open to having their plans and assumptions challenged. Red team execution 
traps and pitfalls have the potential to reduce the overall effectiveness of these 
techniques.  
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VI. FINDINGS, PROPOSALS, AND CONCLUSIONS  
Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes of war, not upon 
those who wait to adapt themselves after the change occurs. 
~ Giulio Douhet—1922 
 
The security planning for major events requires the participation of dozens of 
local, state, and federal law enforcement, fire, and life safety entities working in 
coordination. The subcommittee process employed in these major events has proven 
effective in marshaling tremendous amounts of resources and ensuring that areas of 
responsibility are well-defined; however, it leaves open the potential for individual and 
organizational biases to impact planning. The 2009 presidential inauguration case study 
demonstrated that even with significant amounts of time and resources, highly 
experienced planners still use mental shortcuts, or assumptions, to fill in missing 
information that can lead to poor outcomes.  
The failure to anticipate the behavior of the event participants in the inauguration 
did not result in fatalities; however, it should be used as a cautionary tale for those 
individuals and organizations responsible for the safety and security of these major 
events. It is impossible to determine how often these types of planning errors have 
occurred in previous major events, but the results of this research indicate that a potential 
exists for recurrence within the subcommittee framework. The organizational structure of 
major-event security planning creates information “silos” within which individual and 
group decision-making errors can occur.  
This thesis has investigated the need for and potential benefits of formally 
adopting a red team mechanism into the security subcommittee framework of major 
events. The capabilities of these red team techniques theoretically offer the potential to 
reduce poor planning and are designed to “challenge facts and explicit assumptions, look 
for implicit (unstated) assumptions, identify cultural assumptions and develop targeted 
cultural questions for subject matter experts, challenging the problem frame (and 
proposing alternative frames), identifying cognitive biases and symptoms of underlying 
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groupthink.”172 The execution of these techniques, however, can be challenging and 
diminish the effectiveness of red teaming.  
These techniques are currently being used in both the DOD and the American IC 
and these organizations share many similarities with the law enforcement agencies that 
participate in the security design and execution for major event security. As such, the 
formal adoption of red team techniques within major event security appeared to be a 
natural fit. Research on red teams, however, indicates that their effectiveness varies on 
the organizational leadership, team training and composition, and independence afforded 
these teams in the performance of their assignment. The execution traps outlined in 
Chapter II indicate that these techniques can be difficult to implement successfully. 
Organizations experienced in “grading their own homework” may resist having their 
planning decisions exposed to outside review and criticism.173 Additionally, red teams 
must be provided a degree of independence to question an organization’s plans without 
fear of reprisal or simply being made a “rubber stamp” to a predetermined course of 
action, such as President Johnson’s use of the devil’s advocate during the Vietnam War. 
The formal adoption of red team techniques has the potential to improve decision making 
in major events; however, these events are not planned and executed in a vacuum. If not 
properly supported and implemented, attempts to red team major security planning may 
only solidify commonly accepted assumptions and paradoxically work against the goal of 
helping planners see situations, problems, and solutions from alternate perspectives.174 
The MC 02 exercise outlined in Chapter II demonstrated that red teaming can be 
manipulated to pervert the planning process.  
A. RED TEAM PROPOSALS  
The use of analytical red team techniques in major-event security planning has the 
potential to improve the overall process by reducing individual and group decision-
making errors. This section advances two different proposals to inject red team 
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techniques into major-event security planning for consideration. Each proposal has 
specific strengths and weaknesses that would need to be considered prior to 
implementation and are discussed in this section.  
1. DHS Major Event Red Team Pilot Program  
The DHS should design, staff, and implement its own red team composed of 
subject-matter experts selected from department component agencies. Volunteers would 
apply to the DHS to serve on a part-time red team whose purpose is to support the 
subcommittee model at NSSE and SEAR 1 events. Initially, the DHS should contract 
directly with the UFMCS, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to design a groupthink mitigation 
and analytic analysis program for these members. The UFMCS has a demonstrated 
ability to educate DOD officials in these techniques and would be considered the subject-
matter experts in this area until the DHS can develop its own in-house capability.  
This team would be activated to support NSSE and SEAR 1 executive and 
subcommittees and would provide an analysis of operational plans two months before the 
event date.175 This timeline would enable the subcommittee in question to adjust 
resources and priorities if needed. This red team should also be involved in providing 
after-action reviews and post-event analysis to assist in determining if the final security 
plan contained poor assumptions or weaknesses available for exploitation. These “lessons 
learned” would then be captured for future use in the security planning for similar major 
events. This benefit would be especially useful for events that occur in the same location 
yearly, such as the United Nation’s General Assembly in New York or the State of the 
Union Address held in Washington, DC.  
A Major Event Red Team (MERT) pilot program would train current DHS 
subject-matter experts in red team techniques. This unified DHS team would share a 
common command structure and report directly to the executive committee, as well as the 
department itself. Access to the individual subcommittees and their plans would need to 
be ensured for the MERT to be of value. A senior-level team leader with experience in 
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major event planning should be selected by the department to protect against the red team 
becoming subordinate to the executive committee and also to increase the likelihood that 
the red team results are considered by the security subcommittees.176  
The MERT program should last initially for 36 months. This period allows for a 
sufficient number of major events to occur for the program to be evaluated. Evaluation 
metrics for program consideration include adjustments made by the subcommittees based 
on MERT recommendations, feedback from subcommittee chairs, and after-action 
reviews of final event plans. The future development of a training curriculum within the 
DHS would depend on the initial pilot program results and funding. Additionally, this 
trained cadre of red team practitioners would remain within the DHS and could bring 
those skills back to their component agencies for an ancillary benefit to the department.  
2. Executive and Subcommittee Chair Red Team Education  
The DHS should contract with the UFMCS to design and implement a groupthink 
mitigation program and analytical analysis program exactly as in recommendation 1. This 
program should then be offered specifically to executive and subcommittee chairs at the 
local, state, and federal level prior to the initiation of NSSE and SEAR 1 planning. These 
chairs will be responsible to lead all subcommittee meetings within which poor planning 
can potentially occur and having them trained in analytical techniques at the onset may 
assist in reducing the potential incidents of groupthink early in the process. The potential 
benefits of this recommendation include red team trained individuals physically present 
during all phases of plan formulation, a greater likelihood of executive and subcommittee 
leadership acceptance of techniques, less cost to the DHS, as local and state chairs are 
responsible for their own expenses in attending the course, and less impact to the DHS 
component agencies as compared to recommendation 1.  
This recommendation also has significant negatives that need to be carefully 
considered prior to implementation. First, individuals instrumental and emotionally close 
to planning often have a difficult time acknowledging shortcomings, which is one of the 
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hallmarks of groupthink. This recommendation assumes that red team trained 
subcommittee chairs will bring back the lessons to their planning operations and put them 
to immediate use. The DOD has determined that not everyone is suited to serve in a red 
team capacity, and therefore, the results will likely be inconsistent as different planners 
will embrace these techniques at various levels.177  
B. CONCLUSION  
This thesis has explored the varieties of red team techniques available to major 
event security planners and asked the question: How would the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) benefit from formally adopting a red team component to major-event 
security planning? The potential benefits and drawbacks of simulations, vulnerability 
probes, and analytical techniques have also been explored in this project. Based on the 
findings on red team performance and execution pitfalls, this thesis has made two 
proposals to insert an analytical red team capability formally into the framework used in 
major-event security planning. The proposals have the potential to place properly trained 
individuals into the framework at the appropriate time to make improvements into the 
planning process. These proposals, however, will have to navigate the minefield of 
potential execution errors outlined in this thesis. While the DHS theoretically will benefit 
from the formal adoption of analytical red team techniques, the execution limitations 
discussed in this thesis reduce the likelihood for ideal results. The DHS needs to consider 
these limitations before formally adopting a red team component into the framework for 
major-event security planning.  
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